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KEEPING RECESS APPOINTMENTS IN THEIR PLACE
Brian C. Kalt *

The federal appointment process has degenerated in recent decades.
As the Senate has become more comfortable ignoring nominations instead
of rejecting them, Presidents have become more comfortable pushing their
recess-appointment powers to their fullest extent—and perhaps beyond. 1 In
his piece on the Recess Appointments Clause, Seth Barrett Tillman offers a
clever way for the Senate to respond, which I will call the “Tillman adjournment.” 2 This response suggests some reasons why the Senate is
unlikely to try a Tillman adjournment. In brief, the tactic suffers from both
constitutional problems and even deeper practical problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Recess Appointments Clause states that “[t]he President shall have
Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the
Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session.” 3 In the first century of the Republic, the Senate was in recess
most of the time. 4 By allowing the President to fill critical vacancies unilaterally but temporarily, the Recess Appointments Clause allowed the Senate to stay home without the executive branch crumbling, but also without
giving the President too much unchecked power. 5
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1
Two good accounts of the Recess Appointments Clause that critique presidential excesses are Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487
(2005) (link), and Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess
Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204 (1994).
2
Seth Barrett Tillman, Senate Termination of Presidential Recess Appointments, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 82 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/2/ (link). All
quotations and citations of Tillman in the text refer to this piece unless otherwise noted.
3
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (link).
4
For a full accounting of congressional sessions and recesses from 1789 to 2003, see UNITED
STATES SENATE, SESSIONS OF CONGRESS (2003), http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/congresses2.pdf (link). Subsequent references to the history of sessions and recesses are supported by this
document as well.
5
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 329 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) (link) (“[I]t
would have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers . . . .”).
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Times have changed. The Senate spends relatively little time in recess
now, so comparatively few vacancies arise during recesses, and most of
those vacancies could wait to be filled until the Senate returns. Even
though the original purpose of the Clause is thus largely moot, the Clause’s
broad language allows Presidents to use it for another purpose: as a bludgeon rather than a bandage. Imagine that the President has nominated someone who will not get confirmed, but also will not get an up-or-down vote.
The irked President waits until the Senate takes a couple of weeks off, and
installs the nominee with a recess appointment. The appointee serves, the
Senate is angry that the appointee is in office, the President is grumpy that
the appointee is a short-term lame duck, and the ill will feeds on itself.
Tillman suggests that, because recess appointments expire at the end of
the “next session,” the Senate can toss a recess appointee out of office simply by ending its session early. 6 If the President appoints someone between
sessions, the Senate can come back to its “next session” and end it a moment later. A moment after that, the Senate can open another new session
and go about its business none the worse for wear. If the President instead
appoints someone during an intra-session recess, the Senate can just lower
the gavel twice when it comes back: once to end the first session, and then
again to end the “next session.” Either way, Tillman says, the Senate can
send the recess appointee packing.
There are three reasons why the “Tillman adjournment” is not viable.
First, by involving the House of Representatives in the appointment process, a Tillman adjournment would be a constitutional impropriety, a violation of the clear structure and intent (if not the letter) of the Constitution.
Second, the President could easily nullify the Senate's action, making
Tillman adjournments pointless at best, and needlessly provocative at worst.
Third, the Senate has other tools at its disposal that avoid these practical
and constitutional problems.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Tillman argues that “[a]s a textual matter it appears that the decision
[of when the session ends] is one for the Senate alone to make.” 7 This is
wrong—the Senate cannot unilaterally end a congressional session. The
Constitution provides, and uniform historical practice confirms, that a regular session ends when the Senate and House agree that it ends; if they cannot agree it falls to the President to adjourn them . . . or not. 8 Of course, the
6

Tillman, supra note 2, at 83.
Id. at 4.
8
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (link) (giving the President power to decide on adjournment if House and
Senate disagree on adjournment); see also id. at art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (link) (limiting one-house intra-session
adjournments to three days or less); id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (link) (placing “question[s] of adjournment”
logically among things for which “the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be
necessary”); id. at amend. XX, § 2 (link) (giving “Congress” authority to determine by law when to con7

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/3/
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House and Senate can agree to all sorts of structures for adjournment—
some terms of Congress have had three regular sessions rather than two,
and some sessions have ended with one chamber adjourning weeks later
than the first—as long as both chambers agree on that structure. 9
Although he doubts it, Tillman admits the possibility that the House
would need to sign off on a Tillman adjournment. He says that even if this
is so, it would still “represent a sea-change in our current recess appointment practices.” 10 He is more right than perhaps he realizes; entangling the
House in the appointment process would be grossly inconsistent with the
Constitution's clear structure. Put simply, appointments are supposed to be
a matter for the President and the Senate to work out, and the House should
have no role.
That said, if the Senate could get the House to agree to a Tillman adjournment, the session would indeed end, and the President's existing recess
appointments would indeed expire. The action would not be unconstitutional as such. However, it surely would be—to use Stephen Carter's
term—a “constitutional impropriety”: something that no court could strike
down, but which is nevertheless inconsistent with the Constitution, and
which any member of the House who takes his oath seriously should avoid
doing. 11
III. POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS
Tillman also argues that “the President simply plays no role (or next to
no role) in decision-making involving the Senate’s decision to recess and to
reconvene.” 12 Just as he oversold the Senate's power above, he undersells
the President's power here. Not only can the President convene special sessions of Congress, he can also convene a special one-chamber session. 13
Presidents have convened forty-six such special sessions, and in all fortysix cases, the one chamber they called was the Senate, usually to consider
nominations. As a practical corollary to the President's unquestioned power
to convene (and reconvene, and re-reconvene) the Senate, the Senate cannot
functionally adjourn these special sessions if the President is not ready to
allow it. Indeed, these special sessions traditionally ended only after the

vene).
9

See Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why
Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1346–47 (2005) (link) (discussing concurrent resolutions and ends of sessions).
10
Tillman, supra note 2, at 86.
11
Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 358 (1990).
12
Tillman, supra note 2, at 85.
13
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (link) (“[H]e may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or
either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he
may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper . . . .”).
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/3/
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Senate formally asked the President whether he had any further business for
it, and the President said no. 14
Because of this constitutional structure, even though a Tillman adjournment could be done—constitutional improprieties notwithstanding—it
14

To take the most extreme example, in the special session of 1867, the Senate rejected large numbers of Andrew Johnson's Democratic nominees and waited impatiently for him to nominate Republican
ones. The House's first attempt to impeach Johnson was pending. Senators threatened to adjourn with
the offices in question unfilled, as they technically had the power to do. Nevertheless, the Senate eventually cooled down and informed the President that it would adjourn at a particular time unless he had
further business for them. In the end, the Senate adjourned only after Johnson indicated that he did not.
See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., Spec. Sess. 821–51 (1867) (link). For three earlier instances in which
the Senate used the same approach, see 48 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 393, 395, 397 (Washington, Nicholson 1856–57) [hereinafter SENATE J.] (link); 44 id. at 363
(Washington, Armstrong 1852) (link); 42 id. at 295–96 (Washington, U.S. Senate 1850–51) (link).
More often (on twenty-nine occasions), the Senate used a more deferential formula: inquiring
whether the President has further business for it, hearing that he does not, and then adjourning either
immediately or after conducting internal business. See 55 CONG. REC. 87, 95 (1917); 50 id. at 35
(1913); 44 id. at 8, 12 (1909); 40 id. at 33 (1905); 37 id. at 140 (1903); 100 SENATE J. 284 (1901); 25
CONG. REC. 112, 159–60, 180 (1893); 12 id. at 540 (1881); 12 id. at 471 (1881); 4 id. at 149 (1875); 1
id. at 205 (1873) (link); 57 SENATE J. 355 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1864) (link); 55 id.
at 455 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1863) (link); 52 id. at 433 (Washington, Bowman,
1860–61) (link); 51 id. at 785 (Washington, Bowman 1859–60) (link); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st
Spec. Sess. 1691–92 (1859) (link); 49 SENATE J. 726 (Washington, Harris 1857–58) (link); CONG.
GLOBE, 31st Cong., Spec. Sess. 355 (1849) (link); 36 SENATE J. 286–87 (Washington, Gales & Seaton
1844) (link); CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1841) (link); 13 REG. DEB. 1038 (1837) (link);
18 SENATE J. 205 (Washington, Duff Green 1828) (link); 14 id. at 284–85 (Washington, Gales & Seaton
1824) (link); 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 226 (1817) (link); 19 id. at 466 (1809) (link); 10 id. at 762–66
(1801) (link); 6 id. at 1586 (1797) (link); 4 id. at 868 (1795) (link); 2 id. at 1830 (1791) (link).
There are exceptions to this pattern, however. See 131 SENATE J. 311 (1925) (performing the usual
inquiry, the President notifying the Senate that he “would communicate later with the Senate in writing,”
and the Senate adjourning some time later); 21 CONG. REC. 62, 67, 73 (1889) (performing the usual inquiry, the President notifying the Senate that “he will to-day communicate to the Senate certain messages, but after that no other messages will be communicated except of a formal character to fill
vacancies as they arise,” and the Senate adjourning after doing the requisite work); 17 id. at 97 (1885)
(performing the usual inquiry, the President notifying the Senate that he “knew no reason why the Senate should not adjourn after disposing of the nominations already made,” and the Senate adjourning after
doing the requisite work); 6 id. at 40–41 (1877) (adjourning on Saturday after President replied to usual
inquiry by saying that “he would probably not require the presence of the Senate longer than Saturday or
possibly Tuesday next”); 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 624 (1798) (link) (adjourning after the usual inquiry, the
President notifying the Senate that he has one more nomination, and the Senate approving it); 3 id. at
668 (1793) (link) (“After acting upon several nominations received from the PRESIDENT, the Senate adjourned, sine die.”).
On a few occasions, the record does not show that Senate observed the formal procedure at all. In
the special sessions of 1869 and 1871, the Senate disregarded specific attempts to follow the usual procedure, but in a way that makes it fair to say that the issue was just lost in a shuffle of other matters. See
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Spec. Sess. 930 (1871) (link) (attempt by Senator Harlan); id., 41st. Cong,
Spec. Sess. 727 (1869) (link) (attempt by Senator Conkling). In two cases, the special session ended
without the usual formality, but a special bicameral session convened very shortly thereafter. See 77
CONG. REC. 36 (1933); 30 id. at 8 (1897). Finally, in three other cases, the Senate simply adjourned sine
die without any evidence in the record of communication with the President. See 73 id. at 384 (1930);
71 id. at 15 (1929); 61 id. at 72 (1921).
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/3/
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would not work as a practical, political matter. No President would take
such an unprecedented and aggressive action by the Senate lying down. As
the Tillman adjournment ended his recess appointments, the President could
simply take advantage of the adjournment to re-appoint all of them, sending
things back to square one.
Constitutional shenanigans like this really do happen. In 1903, for example, a special session of Congress ran so long that it bumped up against
the scheduled start of the regular session. On December 7, with the strike
of the gavel, the special session ended and a regular session simultaneously
began. In the infinitesimal—if that—separation between the two sessions,
President Theodore Roosevelt made 160 recess appointments. Two of them
were renewals of prior controversial recess appointments. 15
Relatedly, a President could make a recess appointment and then convene a special session of the Senate, refusing to allow it to adjourn until the
end of the term, thereby extending the recess appointment's tenure to its
maximum. If the Senate tried to adjourn anyway, the President could rerecess-appoint everyone as described above, then reconvene the Senate
again. Outside of impeachment, which is always on the table in any case,
there would be nothing much that anyone could do about it. 16
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE TILLMAN ADJOURNMENT
There are some things that the Senate can do—and does do—that
would be more appropriate and effective in hemming in the President's ability to make recess appointments. While the Tillman adjournment is akin to
bringing a knife to a gunfight, the Senate does have a small firearm or two
in its arsenal.
First and foremost, instead of dashing forward to the constitutional
brink, the Senate can take a step back and just do its job. Instead of letting
controversial nominations last until a recess, teeing up controversial recess
appointments, the Senate can just vote on them. Tillman praises his maneuver because it forces the Senate to act affirmatively against the President, but the solution to the recess-appointment problem is not more
recesses; it is fewer vacancies. If the Senate has the votes to take an affirmative step, it should take the simpler and less problematic step of voting
on the nominee when it can. If the Senate does not like a nominee, it can
say so by rejecting him. Although a President technically might try to recess-appoint a rejected nominee anyway, there is a good argument to be

15

See T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RECESS APPOINTMENTS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 10
(2005), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/50801.pdf (link).
16
Indeed, when President Johnson was impeached, the struggle over convening and recessing the
Senate discussed in note 14, supra, was not among the charges against him. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 2nd Sess., Supp. 3–4 (1868) (link).
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/3/
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made that this would be unconstitutional. 17 At the very least, it would mean
that the President would be the one committing a constitutional impropriety.
A more subtle option is to use the power of the purse. It complicates
the President's task if his recess appointees must work for free, and Congress has the power to make that happen. Current law, for instance, eliminates pay for recess appointees in cases where the President has arguably
misused his appointment power, though it makes exceptions for cases in
which the Senate has arguably misused its confirmation power. 18 If both
sides are interested in strengthening the incentives for both sides to act
properly—or if a veto-proof majority in Congress is interested in unilaterally strengthening the President's incentives to act properly—this law could
be strengthened. While passing legislation like this would drag the House
into the appointment struggle, it is proper for the House to be involved in
questions of executive pay. Assuming that the new law applied generally
and prospectively, it would not raise the same level of constitutional difficulty as House participation in a Tillman adjournment.
Beyond these two options, the Senate has other ways to assert itself,
but these two examples should make the point adequately: the current conflict over appointments is neither inevitable nor intractable. The Senate has
other, better options at its disposal than the Tillman adjournment.

17

See, e.g., Staebler v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 585, 601 n.41 (D.D.C. 1979) (“A President could probably not consistently with the principle of checks and balances grant a recess appointment to one rejected
for the particular position by a vote of the Senate.”). Without this limit, the Senate's power to reject
nominees would be reduced to a near nullity, which at the very least is structurally problematic.
18
See 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (2000) (link). Section 5503 provides that recess appointees cannot be paid if
the vacancy arose before the recess. There are three exceptions: if the vacancy arose less than 30 days
before the end of a session; if the Senate rejected someone else for the job less than 30 days before the
end of the session; or if the President nominated someone to fill the vacancy and the Senate did not act.
The law appears to provide further that, even if one of these exceptions applies, the appointee will not
get paid if the President fails to re-nominate him within forty days of when the Senate reconvenes.
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/3/
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